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In recent years, the Vietnamese government has emphasized its commitment to create a 
fair business environment for both the state and non-state sectors in its medium and long-
term economic development programs. This paper examines the development of the 
private sector in Vietnam, focusing in particular on the relationship between the state and 
the private sector. The first part of the paper reviews the trends in private sector 
development, the second part discusses obstacles for private sector development, with 
focus on the role of state-owned enterprises, and the third part discusses future challenges 
and suggests some policy reforms on the basis of the lessons from the first two decades of 
economics reforms in Vietnam, as well as international experiences. The paper also 
considers the pattern of new firm establishment, including the impact of foreign 
investment on the domestic private sector.   
 
Key Words: Vietnam, economic reforms, private sector development, SOEs 
 




One of the most remarkable achievements of Vietnam’s economic transition – 
particularly during the past decade – is the emergence of more dynamic and stronger 
private sector. Since the promulgation of the new Enterprise Law in 2000, over 120,000 
new enterprises have been registered, reflecting both the formalization of existing 
household businesses as well as the creation of new private firms. Private sector 
development has become an important area for the Vietnamese economy, and the role of 
the private sector has been acknowledged even by the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP). In particular, it is recognized that the domestic private sector is essential for job 
creation, and private firms have been much more successful than state enterprises in 
generating new employment during the past decade (World Bank 2006).   
Yet, despite the increasing prominence of the private sector, there is some 
evidence indicating that it might not be as dynamic and competitive as the growing 
number of business registrations suggests. Firstly, the number of newly registered 
businesses may be a misleading indicator of the expansion of the private sector. The 
figures do not provide information about whether the registered businesses are in 
operation, providing jobs for the growing labor force, or if they have already terminated 
or perhaps not even started their operations. Secondly, the size distribution of enterprises 
in Vietnam gives some cause for concern. Despite twenty years of economic reforms, the 
development of the private sector is almost entirely associated with small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs), or more accurately, small and micro sized enterprises. The 
middle of the size distribution is very narrow or almost missing. The large firms that do 
exist are mainly state-owned or foreign-owned enterprises.  
An enterprise size distribution with a missing middle is not necessarily a problem, 
as illustrated by the performance of countries like Sweden, which is ranked as one of the 
world’s most competitive economies in spite of a similar size distribution of firms. 
However, in the case of Vietnam, there is reason to believe that this structure is a 
symptom of a weakly functioning business environment, where different types of firms 
meet different rules and regulations. Although the number of wholly state-owned  2
enterprises has decreased as a result of the on-going equitization process, the SOE sector 
is still in a dominant and favored position in critical areas (e.g. access to resources). 
While this is obviously not any great obstacle to the emergence of private SMEs, it 
inhibits the development of larger private firms.  
Hence, although government policies support the development of small private 
enterprises (for instance, following the introduction of an SME Decree in 2001, a special 
Agency for SME Development was established in the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment) there is no official policy supporting the growth of small private firms into 
larger ones. On the contrary, in the Vietnamese debate, the terms “private sector” and 
“SMEs” are often considered as synonyms. While it may be politically convenient for the 
reform-minded to talk about SME promotion rather than private sector promotion 
(because it is less likely to meet opposition), the terminology also reveals that the private 
sector is still subordinate to the state sector. Large firms are generally expected to be 
state-owned. To release the growth potential of the Vietnamese private sector, it will be 
necessary to change this relation between the state and the private sector. To promote the 
long-term growth and competitiveness of private firms, the Vietnamese government will 
have to define the role of the state as complementary rather than competitive to private 
entrepreneurship. The introduction of a unified enterprise law, draft versions of which are 
currently discussed, will be an important step in the right direction. A commitment to 
private sector development requires not only that SOEs and private firms are equal in the 
eyes of the law, but also that the remaining privileges of SOEs are abolished.  
This paper examines the development of the private sector in Vietnam, focusing 
on the relationship between the state and private sector. Two dimension of the state are 
discussed: the role of the state as a policy maker, and the role of the state as an actor in 
the productive sectors, in the guise of state-owned enterprises. The first part of the paper 
reviews the major milestones of the private sector’s development, and concludes that 
economic policy reforms have created a business environment where formal rules and 
regulations are increasingly favorable to private business. Evidently, the relation between 
the private sector and the state (acting as a policy maker) has improved continuously. The 
second part discusses the remaining obstacles for private sector development. Many of 
these obstacles are related to state-owned enterprises, who have privileged access to  3
markets, capital, and land and tend to crowd out private firms. The third part discusses 
future challenges and suggests some policy reforms on the basis of the lessons from the 
first two decades of Doi Moi, as well as international experiences. The paper also looks at 
the pattern of new firm establishment, including the impact of foreign investment on the 
domestic private sector.   
Private Sector Development under Doi Moi 
 
The past twenty years have witnessed a number of important milestones for Vietnamese 
private sector development. The Doi Moi (renovation) program was launched at the Sixth 
Party Congress in 1986, where a program of major reforms to abolish the system of 
“bureaucratic centralized management based on state subsidies” and to move to “a multi-
stakeholder, market oriented” economy, which included a role for the private sector, was 
adopted. Several changes in the legal framework for the private sector followed during 
the first half of the 1990s. In 1990, the Private Enterprises Law established a legal basis 
for the establishment of sole proprietorships and the Company Law opened up for limited 
liability and joint-stock companies. Tax reforms introduced special sales taxes, turnover 
taxes, and profit taxes. The role of the private sector was officially recognized soon 
thereafter, in the Constitution of 1992. In 1993, the Bankruptcy Law was approved, and 
the Domestic Investment Promotion Law that gave domestic investors access to some of 
the incentives available to foreigners was promulgated the following year. 
In the early 1990s, the Vietnamese economy began to reap the rewards of the 
reform work: GDP growth averaged almost 8 percent per year during the period 1990-95 
and Vietnam was considered one of the most promising markets and investment locations 
in East Asia. However, the impressive achievements could not completely hide some of 
the structural and systematic weaknesses of the Vietnamese economy. By 1996, donors 
and foreign observers had called attention to problems related to the import substituting 
trade regime and the role of state, in particular the continuing reliance on state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as the main driving force of the development (Kokko and Zejan 1996, 
Ljunggren 1996, Mallon 1996, UNDP 1996). These two issues were intimately related: 
SOEs, often together with foreign investors in joint ventures, were the main beneficiaries 
of the import substituting trade regime. They were also an important interest group, and  4
                                                 
their economic strength and close connections with policy makers at various levels were 
used to protect these privileges. In practice, their influence impeded reforms that would 
have improved the conditions for the emerging private sector. In 1995, the domestic 
private sector, excluding farmers and informal household enterprises, produced only 7.5 
percent of GDP, while the “modern” private sector, consisting of limited liability 
companies and shareholding companies, accounted for at most one percent of GDP 
(Webster 1999). The few larger private firms that did exist were not focused on the 
domestic market, where they would have been forced to take on the SOEs – instead, they 
were strongly export oriented (Kokko 2000). The lack of a dynamic private sector was 
worrying, particularly since it was becoming increasingly clear that the SOE sector would 
not be able to generate enough jobs for the rapidly growing labor force.  
  The Vietnamese authorities gradually became aware of the problems caused by 
these weaknesses in the development strategy. Several of the concerns were addressed in 
the government’s reform plans of the mid-1990s, including comprehensive measures in 
the areas of trade and investment, SOE sector, private sector, financial sector and public 
administration.
1 The measures in the area of private sector development mainly 
comprised additional legal reform. Revisions of the Commercial Law, Company Law, 
and Private Enterprise Law aimed at simplifying the regulatory framework for private 
enterprises. The objectives of the SOE reform plans were more far-reaching, including a 
clear time-table for restructuring of the SOE sector. However, the ambitious objectives 
stated at the policy level were contradicted by the slow implementation of the reform 
resolutions. Moreover, the political rhetoric was also contradictory. For instance, despite 
the statements recognizing the importance of the private sector, the Eighth Party 
Congress in 1996 explicitly restated the objective that the state should hold a central 
position in the country’s economic development. The underlying unwillingness of the 
government to proceed with the SOE restructuring was demonstrated once again at the 
Ninth Party Congress in 2001. Although the Congress recognized a long-term role for 
private sector, the aim to maintain a leading role for the state was reconfirmed. As far as 
can be judged from the limited achievements related to the restructuring of SOEs until the 
 
1 Some of reform plans were summarized in Policy Framework Papers 1994 and 1996 prepared with the 
assistance of the World Bank and the IMF. A summary is also provided in Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003).  5
                                                 
present, this attitude still slows down the reform process.
2 The underlying problem is that 
it may be impossible to simultaneously achieve both a dynamic and competitive private 
sector and a leading role for the SOE sector: the interventions needed to maintain the 
leadership of the SOE sector distort the playing field and inhibit the development of 
private firms.  
  It took until the year 2000 before the next important turning-point for private 
sector development occurred. The Enterprise Law that came into effect that year 
significantly simplified business registration and resulted during the following years in a 
dramatic increase in the number of registered private enterprises. The Enterprise Law led 
to the elimination of over one hundred business license requirements and reduced the 
time and cost needed to register businesses considerably. In 2001, the “Decree on 
Supporting the Development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises” (Decree 91/2001) 
was adopted by the government, formalizing the official definition of an SME and 
outlining the government’s support policies for the development of SMEs. In 2002, the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam convened a Party Plenum 
focusing on the development of the private economic sector.  
As a result of the introduction of the new Enterprise Law, the annual number of 
new private enterprise registrations has increased every year (from 14,457 new 
enterprises in 2000, to 27,662 new firms in 2003 and about 36,000 new registrations in 
2004). By June 2004, the number of firms registered under the Enterprise Law alone had 
risen to 95,357. The surge in the number of registered business has spurred a debate on 
the character of the new firms. In particular, it has been discussed how many of the 
enterprises registered under the Enterprise Law are actually new. The reason is that much 
of the private economic activity in Vietnam has taken place in the informal sector, and it 
is likely that a large share of the newly registered enterprises has been made up of former 
household enterprises. In fact, a survey conducted by the World Bank showed that about 
 
2 It is appropriate to note that the distinction between private and public has not always been clear in 
Vietnam. For instance, one explanation for the relatively strong growth performance of Vietnamese state 
enterprises in the early stages of reforms may have been that they actually implemented incentive structures 
similar to those in private corporations. Each SOE had a designated “owner” within the state – these  
owning ministries, people’s committees , and other institutions acted as residual claimants, and had strong 
incentives to generate profits. These ownership links have become weaker over time, with the Ministry of 
Finance claiming stronger institutional control over the state’s capital assets. Moreover, rumors suggesting 
that state assets are used to finance private investment ventures are not uncommon.  6
                                                 
45 percent of the enterprises registered during the period 2000-2004 were already in 
existence in 2000 in the form of household businesses.
3 One of the most important 
reasons for them to register was to obtain invoice books for the Value Added Tax (VAT), 
without which goods and services cannot be sold to the government and SOEs. The high 
propensity to register may also be interpreted as an indication of increasing confidence in 
the government.   
Most of the registered enterprises fall in the SME category as defined in Decree 
91/2001: 95 percent of the new firms are SMEs, irrespective of whether the enterprise 
category is defined in terms of employment (less than 300 regular workers) or registered 
capital (less than VND 10 billion). In fact, the majority of registered enterprises are 
micro-sized: 80 percent of them employ less than 50 workers. However, the distribution 
of enterprises in terms of size varies significantly across industries. Nearly 90 percent of 
all manufacturing enterprises belong to the SME category. The ratio is even higher in the 
food processing sector (93 percent), but lower in the textile and garment industries (73 
percent), and considerably lower in the leather and footwear sector (50 percent). 
Garments and leather and footwear are the only sectors where large enterprises, with 
more than one thousand regular workers, are relatively common. 
An issue that has been a source of controversy in connection with the Enterprise 
Law is how many of the registered businesses are actually in operation or even in 
existence. Data on enterprise registration are collected by the National Business 
Information Center (NBIC), under the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) while 
data on firms in operation come mainly from the General Statistics Office’s (GSO) 
enterprise censuses, which have been conducted annually since 2000. The enterprise 
census uses a business register that is updated through a link with the tax database of the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). The information from three consecutive surveys of GSO 
indicate that a total of 62,915 enterprises were in operation countrywide at the end of 
2002 (GSO 2004).  This figure is significantly lower than the cumulative number of 
enterprises that had been registered during 1991-1999 under the Company Law and the 
Law on Private Enterprise (44,500 during the decade) and the 2000 Enterprise Law 
 
3 Another survey conducted in 2001 by the VCCI found that roughly 70 percent of the registered 
enterprises were truly new (World Bank 2006).  7
                                                 
(55,792 by the end of 2002). Hence, the total number enterprises registered between 1991 
and end-2002 was about 100,000. There are several ways to reconcile these two numbers. 
Firstly, it is likely that there are firms that have registered but not started any operations 
yet. In the World Bank survey mentioned above, about eight percent of the registered 
firms did not get to the tax code stage, suggesting that they never actually started 
operations. Secondly, the number of businesses that “exit”, i.e. close down their 
operations, is likely to be significant.
4 Since there are no incentives to report exit, most of 
these are not registered. Over the years, the unreported firm exits have accumulated into a 
sizeable share of all registered enterprises, and are likely to account for most of the gap 
between the number of registered businesses and operational ones. Hence, the great 
increase in enterprise registrations since 2000 should be interpreted with caution. It does 
indicate that Vietnam’s private entrepreneurs and businessmen are prepared to take on a 
role in the formal sector, as they chose to register their businesses in large numbers when 
the former licensing procedure was simplified into a registration procedure. It also 
indicates a substantial increase in economic activity, but not of the order suggested by the 
number of newly registered firms. 
Recently, a draft of a new business law that is at least as important as the 2000 
Enterprise Law has been discussed widely. The Unified Enterprise Law (UEL) seeks to 
establish a uniform legal framework for enterprises of different legal forms, regardless of 
their ownership. It is anticipated that SOEs in their current form will not be governed by 
the UEL unless they equitize, i.e. convert into either a limited liability or shareholding 
company. According to preliminary information, SOEs would be given a three- to four-
year adjustment period. However, the exact nature of the future UEL is uncertain, since a 
draft of the law failed to pass a National Assembly vote in November 2005. The 
restructuring of the SOE sector is the most critical point of getting the bill through the 
 
4 A survey of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) conducted by the Institute for Labor Studies and Social 
Affairs (ILSSA) and the Stockholm School of Economics found an exit rate of 15 percent in the early 
1990s and less than 10 percent in recent years (World Bank 2006). The exit rates since the mid-1990s have, 
if anything, been lower than what has typically been found for developed countries. A likely reason is that 
Vietnamese private entrepreneurs have no real alternatives to keeping their business in operation: there may 
be no outside job opportunities, and the bankruptcy law does not provide any opportunities to clear debts 
related to unprofitable business. However, although Vietnamese SMEs are more likely to survive than 
SMEs in developed countries, they are also more likely to change their business lines.   8
                                                 
National Assembly. However, if a sizable share of SOEs remains outside the UEL, then 
the attempt to create a level playing field will be incomplete. 
Private Sector Development and SOEs 
 
One of the main development challenges facing the Vietnamese government is to use the 
limited amount of resources available for public investment efficiently. This does not 
only entail maintaining a high rate of economic growth by providing the needed 
infrastructure, but also to promote an efficient investment climate. Efficiency, in this 
context, assumes a level playing field, where investors from different sectors operate 
under the same rules and regulations, and where the marginal return of investment in 
different sectors can be expected to be more or less the same. At present, this is not the 
case. SOEs still receive favorable treatment, which leads to an inefficient allocation of 
resources and an under-utilization of the economy’s growth potential. To release the 
growth potential of the private sector, it would therefore be necessary reduce or abolish 
the various privileges of SOEs.  
Apart from returns in the form of profit or growth, the recent debate has also 
touched on job creation as one of the desired outcomes of investment.
5 Here, it is obvious 
that there are very substantial differences between the private sector and the state sector. 
Recent World Bank estimates suggest that the cost of generating employment, measured 
as capital requirements per worker, is lowest in the domestic private sector and much 
higher in foreign-invested firms and SOEs (World Bank 2006). More rigorous ways of 
assessing the cost of job creation, based on measures of changes in capital and labor 
endowments over time, suggest a similar picture. For instance, the amount of capital 
needed to create one job in SOEs is nearly five times higher than that in FDI firms and 
more than eight times higher than that in domestic private firms.  
 
5 It may seem somewhat crude to measure the cost of job creation as capital per worker, since SOEs and 
foreign-invested enterprises operate in much more capital intensive sectors than domestic firms. However, 
since job creation is one of the main targets of the socio-economic development of Vietnam – not least 
because of its impact on poverty reduction and income distribution – it is important to recognize the most 
efficient ways of achieving this objective.  
 
  9
                                                 
  Since SOEs evidently use more capital per worker than other types of firms, it is 
also relevant to examine their productivity performance. High capital intensity may be 
motivated provided that the capital is utilized productively, i.e. that it generates a 
sufficiently high return. Apart from capital requirements, the World Bank has also 
explored productivity, and their estimates using census data for manufacturing firms 
show interesting variations in total factor productivity gains across different business 
categories (World Bank 2006). Regardless of the estimation technique, productivity gains 
appear to be higher both in foreign-invested firms and equitized SOEs than in regular 
SOEs. The productivity gains of equitized SOEs are likely to be explained by catching-up 
effects following the restructuring of the firms, but also by selection: many of the SOEs 
that have now been equitized performed better than other SOEs already before their 
equitization. Domestic private firms do not exhibit any lower productivity gains even though 
they have substantially weaker access to various production resources like capital, land, and 
technology. In fact, it is very likely that Vietnam could generate considerable gains in terms of 
job creation and productivity if it was possible to establish a level playing field for all types 
of enterprises.  
  Several studies have examined the factors distorting competition and restricting 
the private sector from reaching its full potential. A recent example is a survey conducted 
by the Mekong Private Sector Development Facility (MPDF) in cooperation with 
researchers from the Australian National University and the Central Institute of 
Economic Management (CIEM) in order to identify the major obstacles encountered by 
private firms and SOEs.
6 Interestingly, unfair competition is perceived as the most severe 
constraint by private firms and SOEs. In particular, a large share of the participating 
private firms (42 percent) experience preferential treatment of SOEs to be a “major” or 
“severe” constraint. Another cause of unfair competition is the high degree of informality 
in the business sector, giving an unfair competitive advantage to noncompliant firms. 
Both sources of unfair competition distort the allocation of resources. Somewhat 
surprisingly, World Bank (2006) argues that Vietnamese private enterprises generally do 
not consider corruption as a serious distortion. According to the Bank’s recent Investment 
Climate Surveys, corruption is ranked as a severe or major constraint to business by less 
 
6 629 answers were received from private firms and 117 from SOEs, the response rates were 16 percent and 
30 percent for respective firm types (Tenev et al. 2003).  10
                                                 
than 15 percent of Vietnamese enterprises, although Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index ranks Vietnam as one of the most corrupt countries in East 
Asia.
7 The proposed reason is that the corruption facing Vietnam’s private entrepreneurs 
is relatively predictable and involves relatively small sums of money. The more severe 
kinds of corruption in Vietnam are likely to be found in SOEs, particularly in connection 
with public procurement and infrastructure investment, as well as in land transactions 
(Kokko 2005a). Although these types of corruption do not seem to influence the day-to-
day operations of private firms, they may have important indirect effects. For instance, it 
may be difficult for private enterprises to participate in public procurement or investment 
projects if their harder budget constraints make it more difficult to pay bribes. The 
assumed prevalence of graft in the land market is also a likely obstacle to the expansion 
of private firms.  
  Taking measures against unfairness caused by informality is difficult, since a 
consequence of informality is that it weakens the efficacy of the government’s 
instruments for improving the business environment. Similarly, reducing corruption is a 
challenging task that will take a long time to achieve. Reducing unfairness due to 
preferential treatment of SOEs, on the other hand, is more straightforward, since SOEs 
are directly under the jurisdiction of the government. Moreover, reforming regulations 
and laws concerning SOEs may be a powerful tool against informality as well, since 
more equal rules reduce the incentives of private firms to conduct their economic 
activities outside prescribed regulations. Hence, one of the most important measures to 
create a level playing field for all types of firms is to commit to a faster restructuring of 
the SOE sector.  
Strictly speaking, economic theory recognizes only market imperfections, such as 
the existence of a natural monopoly or externalities, as motives for state ownership. 
When choosing between private or public provision of goods and services, there are 
basically two types of investment incentives to consider: those aiming to reduce costs and 
those intended to improve quality or to innovate. The evidence on privatization suggests 
that private firms have better incentives with respect to both cost and quality innovation 
 
7 A larger share of entrepreneurs in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand 
reported that corruption was a severe or major constraint, according to World Bank (2006).   11
(World Bank 1995). Government ownership is likely to be superior only under specific 
circumstances. Shleifer (1998) defines these circumstances rather narrowly as situations 
in which: 1) opportunities for cost reduction that lead to deterioration of quality are 
significant and non-contractible; 2) innovation is relatively unimportant; 3) competition is 
weak and consumer choice is ineffective; and 4) mechanisms for reputation-building that 
bring customers back in the future are also weak. If these conditions are not in place – 
and the a priori case for state ownership is weak – it is appropriate to be very specific 
regarding the arguments for keeping firms under state ownership. In addition, it is 
necessary to determine what privileges the SOE needs in order to reach its objectives, and 
to ascertain that the managers of SOEs act according to the public interest. In this 
context, it may also be useful to ask whether the same objectives could be reached 
through appropriate regulation of private enterprise or other means, such as fiscal policy. 
For instance, a common concern by governments is that state ownership is needed in 
order to reach certain “social goals” that are not automatically realized in a free market 
context. However, these concerns can often be achieved more efficiently through a 
combination of market oriented industrial policy in combination with fiscal policies 
targeted to meet the social objectives in question.  
It is clear that the scope of activities of the Vietnamese SOE sector has not been 
determined on the basis of such arguments. Instead, the structure of the SOE sector is 
largely inherited from the pre-Doi Moi period, when state ownership was an ideological 
obligation. There are numerous reasons why the SOE reform process has been slow, 
although the Vietnamese authorities have stressed the need to proceed with the 
equitization of a large number of SOEs (see e.g. Sjöholm 2006). Yet, at the same time as 
the equitization program has been debated, the SOE sector has continued growing, with 
new state enterprises established in several industries, including hotels, restaurants, and 
entertainment, where it is difficult to find any good reasons to prefer public rather than 
private ownership. Moreover, it is important to note the distinction between equitization 
and privatization. The public sector remains the largest individual owner of most 
equitized firms – the average state share is 46 percent (World Bank 2006) – and the 
behavior of SOEs is not likely to change much unless equitization is combined with far-
reaching reforms of management and governance.   12
                                                 
Hence, equitization and reform of state-owned enterprises are important 
determinants of private sector development. This notwithstanding, the experience to date 
suggests that the process of equitization is likely to remain slow, which means that it is 
important to identify other measures that improve the conditions for private 
entrepreneurship in the short term. Most studies on private sector development in 
Vietnam identify access to resources, such as land and capital, and access to markets as 
the major constraints for the private business. In the following, we discuss how these 
constraints are related to the preferential treatment of SOEs.  
Access to Markets 
For the private sector to expand and for small private firms to grow larger, firms need 
access to larger markets. Enterprise surveys suggest that low market potential together 
with too much competition and unfair competition are some of the most important 
obstacles for private sector development.
8 The largest market for private firms today is 
the domestic consumer market. As income levels and domestic demand have increased in 
a mutually reinforcing way, markets for consumer goods and services have expanded, 
providing new business opportunities for the private sector. However, the purchasing 
power of domestic consumers is still small. In nominal terms, Vietnam’s GDP barely 
exceeds the aggregate income of a medium-sized European city like Stockholm (with less 
than one million inhabitants). Given the limited effective consumer demand in domestic 
markets, export markets provide an attractive alternative for private firms. Yet, the fixed 
costs of reaching foreign customers are high, and few private firms, in particular few 
small and medium-sized private enterprises, are able to penetrate highly competitive 
foreign export markets at a major scale. In fact, Kokko and Sjöholm (2005) argue that 
only a few percent of Vietnam’s private SMEs are involved in direct exports, and that 
most SMEs do not have any strategies to take advantage of the opportunities opening up 
as Vietnam is deepening its integration with the global economy. In the short run, it is 
therefore likely that a third alternative – the state sector – offers more realistic 
opportunities: the government is the biggest single purchaser of goods and services in 
many markets.  
 
8 See e.g. Nguyen and Stromseth (2002) and Carlier and Son (2004) for enterprise survey results.  13
It is not uncommon that Vietnamese private firms supply goods and services 
indirectly to the state sector, as subcontractors to SOEs. However, the opportunities to 
obtain a direct contract with the state still remain far from equal for private firms and 
SOEs. Firms interviewed in a mini-survey conducted by the World Bank felt that the way 
the eligibility criteria in the public bidding process are structured is deliberately biased in 
favor of SOEs (Carlier and Son 2004a).  An example is that bidding documents require 
the candidate firms to have many years of past experience, which effectively excludes the 
majority of private firms, given the short history of the private sector in Vietnam. As 
noted earlier, it is also possible that the softer budget constraints of SOEs make it easier 
to channel funds for bribes or “bonuses” in connection with public investment and 
procurement. These kinds of practices create inefficiency and unfair competition that 
favor SOEs to the detriment of both private firms and the government. For private firms, 
the consequence is a combination of a lower growth rate (if they are not able to 
participate as subcontractors) or lower profits (if they act as subcontractors to SOEs that 
capture a share of the profits thanks to their position as middlemen). For the government, 
the outcome is higher costs, as it is forced to pay excessive prices to SOEs that are 
protected from competition from private firms.  
Earlier studies indicate that well-functioning public procurement practices may be 
very profitable for the government. For instance, the Australian Industry Commission 
surveyed 203 studies on competitive tendering and public procurement in the mid 1990s 
and found cost savings of about 10-30 percent in almost half of the studies (Industry 
Commission 1996). Among the remaining studies, the cost savings were larger in one 
half and smaller in the other half of the cases. The potential for costs savings seemed to 
be about 30 percent in transport and technical services and about 10 percent in services as 
health care and geriatric care. In Vietnam, the role of the state reaches much further and 
the preferences given to SOEs are much more comprehensive than in non-socialist 
industrialized countries, which implies that the potential cost savings from more efficient 
public procurement practices are even larger.  
Although cost savings make up an important motive for efficient public 
procurement, an equally important motive in Vietnam should be leveling the playing field 
for all types of firms and supporting private sector development. A prerequisite for public  14
                                                 
procurement to play an important role in this respect is that the prevailing close ties 
between SOEs and the government are managed appropriately, so that non-government 
actors can confidently expect equal treatment and equal opportunities in the bidding 
process. Corruption and lobbying are well-known problems of public procurement also 
outside Vietnam, and the fact that SOEs are well connected with public decision makers 
does not make these concerns less serious. Through its connections to government 
officials, the management of SOEs may for instance have access to non-public 
information about procurement contracts that can be used to win the bidding. Martin 
(1999) specifies several ways how governments can, deliberately or not, distort the 
competition in public procurement and make it difficult for private firms to participate. 
These include: 1) pooling of several services into one contract making it impossible for 
small firms to participate; 2) leaving too short time for private firms to submit their bids; 
3) asking private firms to hand in detailed and sensitive information that is not relevant 
for the procurement; and 4) allowing the own entities (government or SOEs) to change 
their bids after the private firms have submitted theirs. It is also common that Vietnamese 
firms dealing with procurement or construction related to government and SOEs are 
obligated to pay kickbacks, which are typically proportional to the value of the 
transaction (Vu and Haughton 2004). All these problems related to public procurement 
constitute disadvantages for private firms, depriving them of market opportunities, and 
cause waste of public resources. The government can play an important role in improving 
market access by targeting these problems and widening the opportunities of private 
firms to supply goods and services to the public sector.  
Access to Capital  
Considering that Vietnam has one of the highest investment rates in the world at present 
– about 37 percent of the country’s GDP is devoted to investment (World Bank 2006) – it 
may appear paradoxical that restricted access to investment capital is often reported as 
one of the main constraints for private sector development.
9 However, the problem in 
Vietnam is not one of capital shortage, but rather one of unequal distribution of capital. 
The state sector accounted for 56 percent of total investment in 2004, but only 39 percent 
 
9 See e.g. Tenev at al. (2003),  Hansen et al. (2004) and Carlier and Son (2004a)  15
                                                 
of GDP; meanwhile, the private sector accounted for about 26 percent of investments, 
with a GDP share of 46 percent. Another illustration of the uneven access to capital is 
that SOEs accounted for 3.8 percent of the total employment in 2003, but received about 
38 percent of the total credit to the economy and 35 percent of the credit extended by 
state-owned commercial banks.
10  
It should be recognized that private entrepreneurs in most countries complain 
about limited access to reasonably priced investment capital, which may be natural 
considering that the relation between entrepreneurs and creditors is typically 
characterized both by asymmetric information and differences in risk preferences. While 
entrepreneurs are inherently prepared to take risks and have all the relevant information 
about their investment venture, banks and other creditors have less information and are 
more risk averse, since they typically manage other people’s money. Still, the share of 
firms that find insufficient access to finance a “severe” or “major” constraint to their 
development is larger in Vietnam than in other countries in the region and worldwide 
(World Bank 2006).  
The ratio of total credit to GDP has increased steadily and is now over 50 percent, 
suggesting that credits are gradually becoming more accessible throughout the economy. 
Still, retained earnings appear to be the main source of finance for private firms in 
Vietnam, accounting for 70 percent of total financing of the 629 private businesses 
participating in a survey conducted by the MPDF (Tenev at al. 2003).
11 Commercial 
banks, the second largest source, provided 11 percent of total financing at the start of the 
business and 15 percent at the time of the survey. The remaining funding came in the 
form of loans from family and other informal lenders. SOEs clearly had better access to 
bank credits as they were able to rely on bank finance to a larger extent. The MPDF 
survey found that 36 percent of the SOEs’ financing came from bank loans, 38 percent 
were equity finance, and the remaining 22 percent came from other sources.  
Numerous studies have tried to identify the factors explaining the limited access 
of private firms to bank loans. These relate both to the banking community’s ability and 
willingness to lend to the private sector and private firms’ ability to meet the various 
 
10 See IMF (2003) and World Bank (2006), Table 7.1. 
11 Kokko (2004) records even lower shares of bank financing among Vietnamese SMEs.  16
                                                 
lending requirements. Constraints that are directly related to the privileged position of 
SOEs are, for instance the persistence of “policy lending” by state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCB) to SOEs, crowding out credit available for private firms, and the 
preference of SOCBs to lend to SOEs due to long-standing relationships. Statistics on 
bank credits show that the four largest SOCBs extended 45 percent of their credit to 
SOEs, while other banks, including joint-stock banks, joint-venture banks, branches of 
foreign banks, two small state-owned commercial banks, and the Central People’ Credit 
Fund extended only 14 percent of their credit to SOEs.
12  
One obvious explanation for the biased allocation of credits to SOEs is that 99 
percent of domestic private firms are small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that 
generally have more difficulties to get credits than large firms with longer credit history. 
Moreover, SOEs stand out as rather secure investment objects due to implicit government 
guarantees for their debt and the very low risk of bankruptcy. The perception that SOEs 
are low-risk customers has probably influenced the lending structure of many banks since 
the late 1990s, when the Asian crisis focused attention on health of the banks’ balance 
sheets. Although published data did not indicate any severe risks related to problem 
credits, it is likely that the condition of the banking system was weaker than suggested by 
official reports. To reduce their risk exposure, most banks tightened their collateral 
requirements, which created a substantial bias against private firms. In some cases, it is 
also likely that banks turned away from private lenders, under the assumption that the 
SOEs were automatically better credit risks since their debts were implicitly guaranteed 
by the state: no SOE had ever been forced into bankruptcy because of unpaid debt. 
The bias against the private sector created by the strict collateral requirements is 
due to the fact that certificates of land-user rights (CLURs) serve as the most common 
type of collateral. The importance of possessing CLURs for access to bank credits has 
recently been stressed e.g. by Malesky and Taussig (2004). Using data from an Asian 
Development Bank study of private enterprise formalization, they found, in particular, the 
possession of CLURs and “connectedness” (in the form of a former job in the state 
sector) to have a significant positive impact on ease of credit. Since the Vietnamese land 
market is very underdeveloped, few private firms have been able to reinforce their land 
 
12 Computed from estimates in IMF (2003).   17
                                                 
holdings through formal CLURs, which puts them in a very weak position in the 
competition for credits: most SOEs have large holdings of land for commercial and 
industrial activities, and are easily able to muster all the required.  
Aside from the banks’ need to buttress their balance sheets, Malesky and Taussig 
(2004) interpret the bankers’ focus on collateral rather than business prospects as a 
response to an insecure legal environment, which does not adequately protect lenders and 
debtors. Several weaknesses in the Vietnamese institutional framework, such as poor 
quality of statements of accounts, underdeveloped bankruptcy procedures, and an 
inefficient legal system, discourage banks to adopt more open-minded attitudes towards 
private firms. The US-based Milken Institute points to the institutional environment as 
one of the major shortcomings of the Vietnamese banking and finance system.
13 The 
institutional framework includes factors such as contract enforcement, property rights, 
corruption, costs of creating and registering collateral, bankruptcy procedures, the 
efficiency of legal system, and the burden of local government regulation: Vietnam has 
obvious weaknesses in many of these areas.  
The unwillingness of banks to accept other types of collateral may partly be 
explained by prudent lending behavior under a weak legal system, but also by the lack of 
knowledge or capacity to evaluate and administer liquidation of other relatively secure 
collaterals such as machinery. The fact that other banks than the four largest SOCBs 
extend a larger share of their credit to private firms suggests that increased competition in 
the banking sector could improve private firms’ access to capital. In 2004, Vietnam 
adopted some major amendments to the Law on Credit Institutions, which established for 
the first time equal opportunities for all commercial banking activities in Vietnam. This 
reform will hopefully bring about more competition in the banking sector. Further reform 
will be necessary as Vietnam joins the WTO. Increased competition in the banking sector 
backed up by efficient enforcement of bankruptcy laws could encourage banks to 
increase their competence in risk assessment and screening, resulting in increased lending 
to the private sector, where the average return to invested capital is likely to be higher.  
 
13 Milken Institute computes a capital access index consisting of seven different components: financial and 
banking institutions; equity market; bond market; economic institutions; alternative capital; international 
access; and macroeconomic environment. In terms of institutional environment Vietnam is ranked 91th 
place among 121 countries.  18
  The gradual increase in the private sector’s share of total credit could be 
interpreted as an indication that these reforms have begun to improve the structure of the 
financial market – the private sector share of bank lending grew from 43 percent in 1998 
to 55 percent in 2003 (IMF 2003). To some extent, this is indeed correct, but it should be 
noted that there is also another reason for the shift in the bank lending shares. To put it 
crudely, SOEs have in recent years gained access to some funding sources that may be 
considered less “intrusive” than bank credits, which require not only collateral but also 
some transparency regarding accounts and business plans. Although detailed data are 
unavailable – illustrating the lack of transparency related to these funding sources – it 
seems that many of the larger SOEs are increasingly turning to other sources of credits. 
These include the Development Assistance Fund (DAF), provincial development funds, 
the Social Insurance Fund, and government guaranteed bond issues.  
  In particular, the DAF has become a major source of finance for SOEs (Dapice 
2004). It channels ODA credits to various users, but it lacks both the more careful 
scrutiny related to formal banking operations and effective budget control, which makes 
it very difficult to assess the quality of its loans. Moreover, many of the DAF projects are 
still in a “grace period” when neither interest nor principal repayments are required. 
Similarly, albeit at a smaller scale, there are several provincial development funds that 
support both infrastructure and industrial investment. Most of the credits from these 
funds are directed to SOEs, but detailed data on the breakdown of borrowers or the 
quality of loans are not available. The Social Insurance Fund (SIF) is a relatively new 
actor in this field, but can be expected to grow exponentially in importance. Fifteen 
percent of the wage sum for all employees in the formal sector will be paid to the SIF to 
cover health insurance and social insurance fees, and the bulk of these funds will be 
invested in industry and infrastructure projects. The outflow of funds from the SIF (in the 
form of retirement pensions) will not accelerate until about 2015, since the only 
beneficiaries before this time are employees in SOEs – for private sector beneficiaries, 
the system requires at least 15 years of contributions, counting from the year 2000 (see 
Kokko and Tingvall 2007). Hence, the fund will continue growing for the coming decade, 
and it is likely that the total capital stock of the SIF will exceed the size of the 
government budget by 2015, making it by far the largest individual investor in the  19
                                                 
Vietnamese market. Again, not much is known about how the existing SIF funds are 
invested, and what degree of transparence and accountability can be expected for the 
future. Finally, the Vietnamese government bond issued in the US market in November 
2005 illustrates another new but non-transparent source of SOE funding. The entire bond 
issue, amounting to USD 750 million at a cost of 7.25 percent per year, was allocated to 
Vinashin, Vietnam’s state-owned shipbuilding company, at unclear terms. While it can be 
questioned whether Vinashin will be able to invest these funds in a profitable manner, it 
is clear that other SOEs have noted the transaction, and many would certainly be eager to 
participate in similar government-guaranteed bond issues in the future. It is also quite 
clear that no private firms will be able to compete with Vinashin in the short to medium 
term, given the enormous subsidy provided though the bond issue.
14 The implicit 
conclusion related to the emergence of these new funding sources is that reforms of the 
banking system are not likely to be sufficient to give the private sector equal access to 
capital: to achieve a level playing field, it is necessary to reduce or abolish the various 
privileges of SOEs.  
Access to Land 
As mentioned earlier, the allocation of land-user rights is a factor that indirectly hinders 
private sector development by restricting private firms’ access to capital. Lack of land, 
and, in particular, uneven allocation of land and underdeveloped markets for land, also 
directly impede the growth of private enterprises. Private firms experience the issue of 
finding suitable premises and land as one of the most difficult aspects of both the start-up 
phase and the subsequent operational phase (Carlier and Son 2004b). The limited access 
to land is partly explained by the physical shortage of available land, since most existing 
industrial land is already allocated (mainly to SOEs) and the “creation” of new industrial 
land through conversion of agricultural land to industrial land has proven very difficult 
and controversial due to problems related to land compensation. While the nominal price 
of agricultural land is very low, industrial land has a very high potential value, and it has 
not been easy to determine how much farmers should be paid when land is converted. 
 
14 It would be interesting to explore what price a private Vietnamese company would have had to pay for a 
long-term credit of USD 750 million. The difference between this amount and the cost for Vinashin could 
provide one approximation of the size of the implicit subsidy provided by the bond issue.  20
However, another important explanation for the constrained land access is that the land 
market does not function efficiently. A large share of the land that is occupied by SOEs is 
either under-used or unused, and could therefore be more efficiently used by private 
enterprises. The problem is that SOEs have weak incentives and no legal means to sell or 
legally sub-lease land to the private sector.  
Despite the legal restrictions, many SOEs do rent their land to private enterprises, 
but this is done informally and at a rate that is several times higher than the official 
leasing rate from the state. The problem with this kind of informal land market is not only 
the high rental, but also the insecurity that is connected to the informal contracts. In 
practice, SOEs can recall the rented land whenever they need to (e.g. due to official 
controls) or whenever they want to (e.g. if another private firm offers a higher rental), 
which discourages the temporary tenant from making any long-term investments or 
business plans. Another problem with such informal contracts is that private firms cannot 
declare the costs related to property use, such as the rental and electricity, as tax-
deductible expenses. Thus, access to land provides yet another example of how the 
advantaged position of SOEs hinders the development of private sector.  
Another alternative for private firms that need land is to try to get provincial 
authorities’ approval to lease land, mainly in industrial zones. This option is perhaps even 
more troublesome, since the process of converting agricultural land to industrial zones 
has proven to be very slow and problematic. The main problem typically been that the 
households holding the original user rights to the agricultural land have not been properly 
compensated for their user rights, but the process of receiving an authorization to “lease” 
a piece of land in the zoned areas is sometimes a very complex and lengthy procedure as 
well. The procedures vary largely from province to province, but typically private 
enterprises have to negotiate with state agencies such as the Provincial Department of 
Planning and Investment (under Ministry of Planning and Investment), Department of 
Finance, Cadastral Office (under People’s Committee), Department of Natural Resources 
and Environment, and local (municipal authorities). This process often takes two to three 
years, involves extensive informal costs, and has an uncertain outcome. The only 
exceptions seem to be found in some of the export processing zones, where special 
regulations have reduced the transactions costs connected with land rental agreements.  21
However, these zones are rarely an alternative for domestic Vietnamese firms, who are 
much too small to be attractive as tenants. 
An obvious remedy to the land issue would be to recall unused and idle land from 
SOEs. The new Land Law mandates SOEs to return any unused land to the state, but in 
practice the option has not been enforced. A plausible explanation is that it is rather 
difficult to recover idle land. Moreover, the authorities may be unwilling to enforce the 
process of recovering unused SOE land due to the on-going equitization of SOEs. For 
many SOEs, land makes up their most valuable asset, and it might be difficult to attract 
outside investors in case of equitization or privatization if this asset is withdrawn. A more 
feasible, market-based option is to allow SOEs to legally rent, lease or even sell (the user 
right of) land to private enterprises in the same way as the new Land Law entitles 
households possessing CLURs to do. Although this option is not an ideal solution to the 
land issue, it could rapidly increase the supply of industrial land and thus bring down the 
rental now prevailing on the informal markets.  
Strengthening the Competitiveness of Private Firms 
 
As discussed above, the uneven playing field for private firms and SOEs makes up a 
serious constraint on private sector development. However, even if large-scale measures 
to level the playing field would be undertaken, Vietnam’s young private sector, which is 
largely based on small and medium sized enterprises, would not able to compete in many 
of the skill and capital intensive industries that still are dominated by SOEs, foreign-
invested enterprises, and foreign products. Therefore, to fully utilize the growth potential 
of private sector and to achieve the country’s ambitious development objectives, it is 
necessary to strengthen the competitiveness of private enterprises. The focus in this 
section will be on two domains that are important for improving competitiveness of the 
private sector and where state institutions can play an important role: export promotion 
and innovation and technology. In relation to the discussion of these domains, we draw 
on some of the lessons from Swedish experiences.  22
                                                 
Export Promotion at the Micro Level 
As Vietnam is gradually opening its borders for trade and turning away from import-
substitution as a development strategy, the contribution of export-led growth becomes 
increasingly important. Since 1995, when Vietnam joined ASEAN’s free trade agreement 
AFTA, trade liberalization has been established as a vital element of the long-term 
development plan. The ambition to become a member in the WTO has also been an 
effective driving force for trade reform in recent years; the same can be said about the 
bilateral trade agreement with the US from 2001. Consequently, trade policy is one of the 
reform areas where progress has been most satisfactory during the past decade. 
Significant improvements in the legal framework for the private sector’s 
participation in foreign trade were introduced already in 1998, when Decree 57 stated that 
all enterprises with a business license were also allowed to engage in foreign trade in the 
goods specified in their business license without any separate import/export permit.
15 The 
number of enterprises registered for foreign trade increased from 2,400 in early 1998 to 
over 5,500 in 2002, corresponding to 55 percent of the total number of trading companies 
(Athukorala2006). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of Vietnam’s 
exports originate from a small number of larger companies. For instance, in their survey 
of the internationalization of Vietnam’s small and medium-sized enterprises, Kokko and 
Sjöholm (2005) found that very few are involved in direct exports, and that the share of 
indirect SME exporters – who act as suppliers and subcontractors to larger exporting 
firms – is also very low. The fact that firms are still allowed to trade only in commodities 
registered in the business licenses is an obstacle for trading private firms.  
Another major difficulty for private firms is to ensure duty-free access to the 
imported intermediate inputs needed for export production, since Vietnam still attempts 
to protect a number of import-competing industries alongside its overall policy, which is 
largely geared towards exports and increasing outward orientation. SOEs often have 
some influence in deciding about the export/import conditions required for the goods in 
their area of operations, which creates much uncertainty for private firms and may 
discourage their export/import activities, although in theory the foreign trade entry 
conditions should be the same for SOEs and private firms. There is evidence, for 
 
15 See Decree 57/1998/NPCP.  Formatted: English (U.K.) 23
instance, that regulatory requirement demanded by line ministries prevent private firms 
from participating in rice exports and fertilizer imports (Auffret 2003).  
While continuing trade reform is a necessary condition for promoting export 
oriented activities, it is not sufficient for enterprises to become export-oriented. There is a 
rather large academic literature identifying the factors that determine which firms start 
exporting. The probability of exporting has been found to be increasing in e.g. firm size, 
productivity, and skill intensity (e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997, Aitken et al. 1997, 
Clerides et al. 1998, Bernard and Jensen 2004). These firm-specific factors are out of 
reach of the direct influence of the government, but can be fostered in a generally 
favorable business environment supported by sound government policies. In the 
preceding section, we discussed some of the most urgent problems distorting the 
emergence of such a favorable business environment in Vietnam.  
In addition to creating a policy environment that is fair and supportive for private 
enterprises, export promotion could embrace more direct measures at the micro-level.  
The Swedish experience illustrates the role the state may play in export promotion at 
micro-level (see Box 1). Of the three main organizations for export promotion, the 
Swedish state owns one wholly (the Swedish Export Credits Guarantee Board, EKN) and 
the two others jointly with the business community (Swedish Trade Council and Svensk 
Exportkredit, SEK). The mandate of these organizations is to provide information and 
guidance, including tailor-made business development advice and market studies of 
foreign countries (Swedish Trade Council); to provide export credits (SEK); and to 
guarantee and to insure export credit risks (EKN) for export firms. The Swedish Trade 
Council also has special programs, including education and guidance, directed to SMEs 
that need support to enter foreign markets. Initially, all the three organizations were 
established in response to requests from the Swedish business community.  
At present, Vietnamese private firms can expect to find very little support in terms 
of information about trade policies and export procedures and assistance in accessing 
export markets. The main player representing the interests of business community, 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce (VCCI), has the function of promoting trade and 
investment. According to a study on business associations, only few associations (other 
than VCCI) are able to conduct trade promotion very effectively and all of the  24
associations feel that they lack the capacity and resources to be able offer quality 
consulting services and /or technical advice to their members (Nguyen and Stromseth 
2002). Roberts and Tybout (1997) and others maintain that new exporters face significant 
start-up costs as they gather information on foreign markets, develop marketing channels, 
adapt products and packaging to foreign tastes, and learn bureaucratic procedures. In this 
respect, the Vietnamese state could play a more active role either by increasing the skill 
level and the capacity of the existing organizations, such as VCCI or the National 
Business Information Center, or to establish a separate organization to provide 
information and guidance to firms willing to export. 
It may be argued that Vietnam’s private sector is still too young to require a 
government organization for export credit guarantees and therefore it should not be a 
priority of the government. However, several transition economies and developing 
countries, such China and Kazakhstan, have recently established state export credit 
guarantee organizations. The China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE) 
was established in 2001 and registered capital of RMB 4 billion which came from the 
state fiscal budget. SINOSURE is mandated to promote Chinese exports and foreign 
investments by means of export credit insurance, export financing facilitation, 
information, and receivables management services. In Kazakhstan, the State Insurance 
Corporation for the Insurance of Export Credits and Investments (JSC) was established in 
2003 as one of the new institutions to promote a shift from the raw material orientation of 
the country and to develop export-oriented enterprises in other sectors of the economy. 
Similar organizations emerged in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan during the 1960s and 
1970s, when these countries launched their export oriented development strategies (see 
Kokko 2006). Export credit guarantee organizations and other trade promotion agencies 
similar to those elsewhere in the region would certainly serve an important purpose in 
Vietnam, given that they were given a clearly defined mandate to support private sector 
development with focus on SMEs and to avoid allocating additional state support to 
SOEs. 
Human Resources and Technology Development 
Vietnam’s revealed comparative advantages at present are in labor and resource intensive 
industries, such as light manufacturing and food products. Therefore, a major focus of  25
industrial policies should be to support the development of these industries.  However, it 
is also important to create a foundation for Vietnam’s future transition to a more modern, 
knowledge-based and globally competitive economy. The Swedish experience from the 
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th and the early 20
th century illustrates the importance of effective education and 
technology policies during early phases of industrial development (see Box 2). Policy 
played particularly important role for the Swedish industrial success by establishing good 
conditions for the development of human resources and an innovation system that, 
combined with institutional reforms, proved very efficient in exploiting the opportunities 
opened up as a result of foreign innovations and foreign demand. 
    The Vietnamese government has traditionally accorded a high priority to 
education. The efforts during the past decade have given Vietnam an international 
recognition for achieving the highest level of literacy and best access to basic education 
of all low-income countries (see Kokko and Tingvall 2007). Since access to primary 
education is largely assured, the current focus in national policies, as reflected in the 
Socio-Economic Strategy 2001-2010 and the Education Development Strategic Plan for 
2001-2010, is to concentrate resources on improving the quality of education. In 
particular, the quality of higher education requires improvements to better meet the 
demands of a more sophisticated market-oriented economy.  
Higher education in Vietnam has been similar to that of the former Soviet Union, 
with a multiplicity of small mono-disciplinary institutions with limited linkages between 
teaching and research. The structures and procedures of the system are inherited from the 
era of central planning, when higher education was segmented by economic sector, with 
many specialized institutions, each with little autonomy of its own, reporting to a 
particular line ministry. Analysis undertaken jointly by the Vietnamese government and 
the World Bank in 1998 concluded that the higher education system suffered from low 
efficiency and quality and was unable to respond to the demands of the market economy. 
Low efficiency in higher education resulted from the small size of higher education 
institutions. There are currently over 200 higher education institutions nationwide 
(Bekkevold et al. 2003). The issue of low quality stems from the perception that 
graduates are not well-equipped for demands of the market economy. Typically, teaching 
at the universities emphasizes the importance of facts over the use of knowledge for  26
problem solving, and aims to provide skills tailored to a particular segment of the labor 
market. The government’s recognition of the inadequacies of higher education has led to 
reforms in tertiary education policy including: 1) introduction of semi-public and non-
public tertiary education; 2) tuition fees and charges for students coupled with 
scholarships; and 3) encouragement of entrepreneurial activity by institutions to raise 
additional non-government revenues. While these measures have gone some way in 
providing a better environment for higher learning, they have also caused some problems 
related to access to education: with increasing out-of-pocket costs, higher education is 
largely out of reach of students from the poorer segments of the population, irrespective 
of the personal qualities of the students. Hence, there is an ongoing debate regarding the 
balance between what can be left to the market and what should be provided by the 
public sector. 
In addition to improving the quality of higher education, there is also a need to 
develop vocational training. The area of vocational training is underdeveloped partly due 
to traditional thinking in terms of preferring universities instead of vocational schools. 
The vocational training system in Vietnam consists of over 220 vocational schools, about 
150 job service centers and over 130 universities, colleges and high schools involved in 
teaching vocations as well as thousands of private vocational training classes in 
enterprises and villages having traditional handicrafts (Bekkevold et al. 2003). Despite 
the large number of vocational training institutes, labor with vocational training is in 
short supply and has weak quality. This picture is confirmed by the respondents of an 
enterprise survey assessing the competitiveness in Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi and 
Haiphong conducted by the MPDF. The participating business leaders stated that 
improving quality of vocational education is an urgent priority of the government (Vu 
and Haughton 2004).  
In many crucial areas, e.g. mechanics, automation, and high-tech industries, 
vocational training is not yet provided (Bekkevold et al. 2003). Furthermore, many 
vocational schools have insufficient materials and facilities due to the low priority given 
to these schools. As a consequence, there is shortage of skilled labor in various sectors 
such as metal cutting, milling, industrial garment making, cooking, metallurgy, mining, 
and so forth. The private sector also faces major constraints in finding experienced and  27
                                                 
well-trained managers. While many can run small-scale businesses, they often lack the 
formal business knowledge and experience that is needed to manage a medium or large 
enterprise facing international competition.  
At the same time, Vietnam is considered by many investors as having a flexible 
and easily trainable work force with a high working moral. Given improvements in skills 
training, Vietnam can potentially transform its current comparative advantages within 
semi-skilled and unskilled labor intensive industries to sectors which require labor with 
higher skill levels. Improving vocational training is certainly an area of priority for 
private sector development. 
Human resources are a prerequisite for science and technology development. 
Skilled labor is required for both adoption of technologies within firms and for science 
and technology development at universities and research institutes. In a recent enterprise 
survey of one hundred garment/textile and chemical enterprises, most of the interviewed 
enterprises stated that in the current context of international economic integration, they 
are required to renew their technology if they wish to improve competitiveness.
16 The 
survey results indicate, however, that most of the enterprises have neither any clear 
business strategy nor any long term investment plan for technological innovation. This is 
more prevalent in SOEs and private enterprises than in foreign-invested firms. The 
survey indicated that the size of the technical workforce in most enterprises was limited 
in comparison with the overall size of the enterprise. Lack of skilled labor and necessary 
professional skills was perceived by the majority of enterprises as a major obstacle for 
technological innovation. The limited capacity implies that enterprises are passively 
absorbing imported technology and not being able to promote creativity and 
technological innovation.  
At present, the links between firms and universities and research institutes are not 
particularly strong. A plausible explanation is that most firms are still in businesses or 
sectors where it is not necessary to be at the technology-frontier and to develop new 
technologies in collaboration with universities. The type of technological innovation used 
most by the surveyed enterprises was purchasing technology from foreign sources (56 of 
 
16 Survey on technological innovation in industrial firms in Vietnam by CIEM and UNDP (2005). The 
survey results show that the share of enterprises ranking different technological innovation activities as 
“necessary” and “entirely necessary” is around 90 percent.  28
                                                 
100 surveyed enterprises) and design copying and reverse engineering (52 enterprises). 
However, the survey also showed that enterprises were keen on cooperating with 
domestic research centers (31 of the surveyed enterprises).  
Some private enterprises stated that an improvement in technology and human 
resources would result in increasing production costs whereas a rearrangement of 
production organization would help reduce production costs. For them, having 
competitive prices was perceived as the most important requirement for survival, which 
explains their priorities. This view is supported by the results of other surveys (Tenev et 
al. 2003). The perception of many Vietnamese firms, both private and SOEs, is that price 
is the main tool for gaining competitive advantages. Advanced technology is not viewed 
as important, although a larger share of SOEs recognized it as the main strength of their 
competitors.
17 An obvious explanation is that many SOEs are active in sectors with a 
larger presence of foreign firms: the competitive advantages of foreign multinational 
enterprises are often related to technology and productivity.  
Apart from the clear need for improvements in education and domestic research 
capacity, it should be noted that foreign direct investment (FDI) may also play an 
important role for human resource and technology development. The entry and presence 
of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) lead to imports of new technology, and it is 
often recognized as a potentially important source of technology and productivity gains 
for local firms as well. The technologies and productivity advantages of multinational 
firms may spill over to local enterprises through demonstration effects, labor mobility (as 
workers trained in foreign firms move to local firms), and various forms of linkages 
between local and foreign firms. The increase in competition that typically occurs when 
foreign multinationals enter a new market provides an additional push for local 
productivity gains, since it motivates incumbent firms to reduce slack and search for 
other ways to improve efficiency in order to maintain their market shares (Blomström 
and Kokko 1998). These gains that may occur in domestic enterprises are not factored 
into the foreign MNCs’ cost calculations, and the amount of inward FDI (which is 
determined on the basis of the foreign MNCs’ private costs and benefits) may therefore 
fall short of the socially optimal amount. This gap between private and social costs and 
 
17 39 percent of the responding SOEs compared to 26 percent of responding private firms.  29
                                                 
benefits provides a motive to subsidize inward FDI (Blomström and Kokko 2003). In 
addition, efforts to promote FDI may, of course, be motivated by expected positive 
effects on capital formation, employment, exports, foreign currency earnings, and other 
indicators of economic development. However, for most of these indicators, there are no 
strong theoretical arguments to expect that FDI will generate vastly better outcomes than 
domestic investment.  
  Like most other countries, Vietnam has therefore encouraged inward FDI. In fact, 
promotion of FDI has been an important part of Vietnam’s economic policies ever since 
the introduction of Doi Moi in 1986. The first Law on Foreign Investment came into 
force in 1987, and the first foreign investors entered Vietnam in 1988, although the 
investment inflows during the first years were disappointingly small. As a reaction to the 
feeble investment response, the Law on Foreign Investment was revised and amended 
both in 1990 and 1992, providing more favorable treatment of foreign investment, 
including tax holidays and provision of land and infrastructure. New amendments, 
relaxing various investment restrictions and providing further incentives to foreign 
investors, were introduced in 1996 and 2000. Over time, Vietnam has also entered into a 
number of bilateral investment treaties that provide additional guarantees to foreign 
investors. Comparing these provisions with the conditions for private enterprise in 
general before 2000, there is no doubt that Vietnam’s formal regulatory framework was 
much more favorable for foreigners than domestic firms. This may actually have been 
one reason for the relative weakness of the domestic private sector during the 1990s: 
Vietnamese private firms were at a disadvantage even if they were able to overcome the 
challenges related to technology, brand names, and other areas where MNCs have 
inherent competitive assets. 
  The gradually more favorable investment conditions, together with low labor 
costs and a rapidly growing economy, have resulted in high inflows of FDI. Official 
statistics state that Vietnam attracted over 6,100 FDI projects between 1987 and 2004, 




18 Not all investment plans are realized, and it is likely that the actual inflows of foreign direct invesment 
are somewhere in the vicinity of 60 percent of the committed funds. However, for several reasons, there are  30
                                                                                                                                                
  These large inflows of FDI have gradually given foreign investors an important 
role in the Vietnamese economy. In the mid-1990s, FDI accounted for around 30 percent 
of gross national investment, but in recent years, the FDI share has stabilized at 15-20 
percent of GDP. The GDP share of the FDI sector has grown continuously and reached 
over 15 percent in 2004. The role of FDI in manufacturing and exports is even more 
dominant. Foreign-invested enterprises have accounted for well over 40 percent of total 
industrial output and about one-third of Vietnam’s total exports. However, due to their 
relatively high capital-intensity, they are not as dominant when it comes to job creation. 
Total employment in the FDI sector was estimated at less than 700,000 workers in 2004, 
which corresponded to about 1.5 percent of the labor force. 
  Yet, it is often complained that FDI has not had any strong impact on Vietnamese 
industry, and that there are no clear signs of technology spillovers to local firms. This is 
somewhat surprising, considering that FDI earlier studies have found positive spillovers 
in many developing countries, including Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and 
Thailand. One reason for the weak impact may be that the early Vietnamese FDI 
strategies probably neutralized some of the competition effects of FDI. Much of the FDI 
inflows that occurred until the mid-1990s were directed to joint ventures with SOEs, 
often in industries benefiting from import protection, and it is reasonable to assume that 
these arrangements reduced the competitive pressure bearing on the SOE sector as a 
whole. Hence, while the SOEs receiving FDI benefited noticeably, they may have 
refrained from competing too strongly with other SOEs. Moreover, Kokko and Tran 
(2005) examined the pattern of technology spillovers from FDI in some more detail, and 
found substantial differences between the effects on SOEs and private firms. While SOEs 
did not seem to be strongly affected by the presence of foreign MNCs in their industry, 
there were stronger signs of productivity gains in private firms. Their explanations for the 
weak effect on SOEs centered on the softer budget constraints and more inflexible 
management practices in SOEs, which may have obstructed sound responses to the 
competitive pressure exerted by foreign investors. They also noted that many SOEs were 
 
no reliable data on the exact FDI inflows. One problem is that much of the FDI inflow is in the form of 
technology and machinery, which is valued by the investor. Another complication is that foreign MNCs 
often aim to finance their foreign ventures by borrowing in the host country market, to make sure that their 
costs and revenues are in the same currency. Moreover, much of capital that enters Vietnam in the form of 
private transfers is actually invested, and should be counted as FDI.  31
more vulnerable to competition from foreign-invested firms, since they manufactured the 
same kinds of relatively advanced and capital-intensive products as foreign MNCs. Since 
Vietnam does not possess any clear competitive advantages in capital-intensive high-tech 
industries, these SOEs often lost market shares, which may have led to a diminished 
ability to exploit economies of scale. Hence, a stronger private sector and fundamental 
reforms of management and strategy in the SOE sector would be needed to fully benefit 
from the potential technology spillovers from FDI.  
Conclusions 
 
This paper has discussed the development of the Vietnamese private sector since Doi 
Moi, with particular focus on the relations between the state and the private sector. 
Although the paper covers developments over a period of two decades, most of the 
emphasis has been on the period from the late 1990s to the present. Before that time, the 
modern private sector was simply too small to play any distinctive role in Vietnamese 
economic development. In the last few years, and in particular since the introduction of 
the Enterprise Law in 2000, the situation has changed, and the private sector has emerged 
as a vital part of the economy. It has played a particularly important role for employment 
creation, accounting for the at least 90 percent of the more than five million new jobs that 
have been added in the labor market since 2000. It is also increasingly important in terms 
of investment, output, exports, and tax revenue. These achievements have arguably been 
the results of a distinct shift in the relation between the state and the private sector. 
Before 2000, the private sector was looked upon with some caution and all new 
enterprises were required to apply for a license before starting their operations – a process 
that took months, involved massive documentation, and a discretionary decision to permit 
the establishment of the firm. Since 2000, the role of the private sector has been 
strengthened, policies promoting the development of SMEs have been established, and 
the cumbersome licensing procedure has been changed to a much simpler registration 
process.  
  However, the private sector still struggles to compete against the privileges 
afforded to state-owned enterprises. The clearest symptom of the lack of a level playing 
field is probably the skewed size distribution of private firms. The private sector is  32
strongly dominated by small firms that operate in sectors and niches where they are not in 
direct competition with SOEs. The few large firms that do exist are often strongly export 
oriented, preferring to face the competition in the global market before the competition 
with privileged SOEs on the domestic market. Apparently, Vietnamese private firms are 
able to establish operations and may relatively easily grow to employ several tens of 
people, but reaching the ranks of medium sized and large firms is difficult for those 
enterprises that are not successful exporters.  
  The main obstacles for the development of private sector are arguably the unfair 
competition from SOEs, which is mainly manifested in problems with market access, 
financing, and access to land. Regarding market access, the main obstacles are found in 
the area of public procurement, where SOEs are favored both by the formal procurement 
regulations and by their contacts with public authorities. With regard to financing, it is 
clear that the public sector appropriates the bulk of Vietnam’s available investment 
resources, crowding out the private sector. The increase in the private sector’s share of 
formal bank credits during the last years does not provide any accurate picture of the 
underlying distribution of investment capital. The SOE share of formal bank lending is 
diminishing largely because SOEs have privileged access to softer financing sources: 
funds from the Development Assistance Fund and regional development funds, the Social 
Insurance Fund, and government guaranteed bonds. However, the allocation of funds 
from these sources is not transparent, and it is not possible at this time to make any 
assessment of what risks are involved in these operations. Finally, the land market makes 
up another serious obstacle for private firms. The continuing high price of land, linked to 
a weakly functioning market and an artificially restricted supply of land, is one of the 
factors restricting private firms from taking the step from small and medium sized to 
large. It is clear that these obstacles should be removed to promote the continuing 
development of the private sector, which is a precondition for Vietnam to reach its 
ambitious long term development goals. The promulgation of a Unified Enterprise Law, 
which has recently been drafted but was rejected by the National Assembly in November 
2005, would be an important next step to clearly announce the intention to reduce the 
privileges of SOEs and to promote private sector development.   33
  In addition to leveling the playing field for the private sector, it would also be 
desirable to introduce stronger active policies to promote and strengthen the development 
and competitiveness of the private sector. Two areas have been highlighted in this paper. 
On the one hand, there is solid evidence from the region and other countries that 
government can support to internationalization of industry, in particular small and 
medium sized firms, without distorting competition. One of the limiting factors in the 
internationalization process is information, both regarding the risks of exports and the 
issues related to product characteristics, such as design and quality. Since information is 
largely a public good, it is easy to argue that publicly funded institutions focusing on e.g. 
credit guarantees, export market information, and quality guarantees could be justifiable. 
The other hand, it is also clear that Vietnam will face an increasing need to upgrade its 
production structure from simple raw material and labor intensive commodities to more 
advanced products. This requires technology, knowledge, and skills, which are presently 
in short supply. Measures to improve the research and education systems, including not 
only higher education but also vocational training, will be needed to provide these goods. 
It is also important to recognize the potential of FDI inflows as an instrument for 
technology and productivity upgrading. So far, Vietnam has arguably not benefited to any 
great extent from spillovers of technology from FDI. The likely reason is the dominance 
of SOEs in the recent past: state enterprises simply seem less able than private firms to 
benefit from positive FDI externalities. Strengthening the private sector would therefore 
bring added gains related to the possibilities to absorb the potential technology spillovers 
from FDI.   34
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Export promotion in Sweden 
 
 
The Swedish economy is largely dependent on export markets. In 2004, total accounted for 46 percent of GDP 
and percent of all goods manufactured in Sweden are exported. Behind the export success of Sweden are a 
number of large corporations such as Volvo, Ericsson, Electrolux, Scania, SCA, Sandvik, Atlas Copco, SKF, 
AstraZeneca and Gambro producing engineering goods, pulp and paper and pharmaceuticals. These firms 
would not have become as large and successful without foreign markets, since expansion possibilities on 
domestic markets are limited in a small country like Sweden. More recently, an increasing number of small 
and medium-sized firms have started harvesting at foreign markets. One factor explaining the success of the 
large established corporations historically, and of the small and medium sized firms today is the support these 
firms have received from export promoting institutions with state commitment. The main actors are the 
Swedish Trade Council, the Swedish Export Credits Guarantee Board (EKN) and Svensk Exportkredit (SEK).  
 
EKN promotes Swedish exports by offering guarantees that protect against the risk of credit loss in 
transactions abroad. EKN was established in 1933 in a time of unemployment and problems for our Swedish 
export companies. During EKN's first years of activity it was especially exports to Russia and the Baltic states 
that were in need of government support in the form of guarantees. A very important motive for the 
establishment of EKN was that guarantee systems had been introduced in several of the most important 
competitor countries and that Swedish companies, it was argued, should have the equivalent support. This 
motive is still as valid, although private credit insurers provide risk coverage for a growing share of the 
world’s export credits. Official guarantee systems are now established in some fifty countries.  
 
The EKN guarantee, which is free of charge, covers exports of goods, services and construction works. The 
most common guarantee covers the risk of non-payment but also risks during production, i e that the buyer 
cancels the contract in part or in full, or that the contract has been interrupted for a longer period, can be 
insured. EKN insures also e.g. against losses caused by political and/or commercial events related to the 
importing country. In practice, it performs the functions of an insurance company and charges a premium that 
reflects the risks of the specific transaction.  
 
During the post-war period the competition on export markets tightened and the buyers of Swedish goods 
started demanding more generous credit conditions. The demand became burdensome for exporters and also 
for the Swedish banking sector. In the end of 1950s commercial banks suggested an establishment of a jointly 
owned export finance institution with state guarantees.  In 1962, an institution with 50 percent state 
ownership, Svensk Exportkredit (SEK), was founded as a result. SEK’s rather long experience of international 
markets, particularly from markets such China and Soviet Union has been an important resource for Swedish 
export firms.  
The Swedish Trade Council was established in 1972 and is owned by the Swedish state and the Swedish 
business community jointly. The main assignment of the organization is to provide information and advice to 
export firm including tailor-made business development advice and market studies of foreign countries. The 
Swedish Trade Council has also special programs, including education and guidance, directed to SMEs which 
need support to enter foreign markets. Since the 1990s the state subsidy has constantly decreased and incomes 
from consulting have increased. It has a turnover of 400 million SEK (50 million USD), 400 employees and 




Technology development during industrialization in Sweden: the case of forestry industry 
 
In the early 19
th century Sweden was still one of the poorest parts of Western Europe. After a slow start, 
industrialization took off in the 1870s and by the early 20
th century, manufacturing industry had developed 
into a driving force of the Swedish economy. The rapid development of Sweden is impressive even compared 
to the performance of today’s newly industrialized countries, and raises questions about how Sweden managed 
to move to the international technology frontier so quickly.  
 
Interpreting the Swedish economic history in the light of innovations and knowledge management, it can be 
argued that the necessary foundation for development was created in the early 19
th century. This foundation 
was partly created through conscious policies in agriculture and education, but also through exogenous 
technical changes. Policies establishing human capital and an innovation system played particularly important 
role for the subsequent industrial success by facilitating the development and diffusion of new technology.  
 
Important developments that increased the level of education and human capital had started well before 
Sweden entered the industrial revolution. The literacy rate of nearly 100 percent was reached within one 
generation after an introduction of mandatory school system in 1842. This proved crucial for the creation of a 
skilled human capital base and the dissemination of new technology. Concurrently, there were important 
changes in the higher education. The old universities in Uppsala and Lund already established in the 15
th and 
17
th centuries expanded throughout the 19
th century, with a greater emphasis on the natural sciences than 
formerly. Several institutions for advanced technical education were also founded during first half of the 19
th 
century; e.g. the Royal Institute of Technology in 1826 and the Chalmers Technical School in 1829. Technical 
colleges were also established in several Swedish cities during the 1850s and numerous vocational training 
schools were set up. Most of the vocational schools depended on private initiatives, although some were 
financed by the state. The state’s engagement increased in this area from the early 20
th century, and vocational 
schools have been important tools for the upgrading of labor skills ever since that time. 
 
Parallel to the development of formal education, there also appeared other institutions that were involved in 
the development of technology and industry. The Royal Swedish Academy dates back to 1739 and the 
Swedish Ironmasters’ Association was established in 1747. The latter was partly state financed and became 
particularly important for the transfer of foreign technology to Sweden. The association started the publication 
of the mining science journal Annalerna in 1817, and financed a very large number of foreign study trips made 
by Swedish engineers and scientists, requiring detailed written reports that were made available to the rest of 
Swedish industry. Several new organizations emerged during the 1860s and in the early 20
th century. These 
institutions were closely in touch with scientific research and technical education and important for the 
diffusion and dissemination of technical skills then and are still important today. 
 
Before the industrial breakthrough, the supply of skilled workers could not be fully exploited in Sweden, but 
they proved to be a strong competitive advantage when other conditions for industrialization were on place. 
Moreover, technical skills often translated in entrepreneurial success. The founders and leaders of several of 
the most successful Swedish companies such as AlfaLaval, AGA, SFK and Ericsson, were educated at the 
technical institutes and had received foreign training that was paid by the state or some of technical 
institutions. It has been argued that successful innovators and entrepreneurs illustrate that a network between 
the technical institutions, industry and the government already existed from the middle of the 19
th century, and 
that this contributed significantly to the success of Swedish industrialization.  
 
In addition to the development of education and research, there were a number of other institutional changes 
that preceded the industrial take-off. One was the restructuring of the state’s forest holdings in the mid-19
th 
century, which meant distribution of large amounts of forest land to private owners and definition of property 
rights. Another notable event was the introduction of Limited Company laws in 1848. Moreover, the financial 
system started developing from the 1830s, with commercial banks, savings banks, mortgage institutes and 
other actors taking over large shares of lending from Riksbanken, the state bank. In combination with the 
advances in education and skills, these institutional founded a system that proved very efficient in exploiting 
the opportunities opened up some years later as a result of foreign innovations and demand. 
 
Reference: Kokko (2005b). 
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